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Abstract 
Strong debates in the varieties of capitalism literature as to whether financial liberalisation and 
internationalisation undermine ‘insider’ corporate governance systems based on patient capital 
in coordinated and state-led market economies have focused on ‘impatient’ overseas private 
capital. However, cross-border state investment has also grown. We examine government 
policies towards a prominent type of state investment- equity purchases by Sovereign Wealth 
Funds (SWFs). We argue that policy makers in insider’ corporate governance systems can see 
such investment as an attractive international source of patient capital to offset declines in 
traditional sources of patient capital. We compare Germany and France and show that policy 
makers actively welcome SWF investment. Policy is driven by coalitions of ‘insiders’ of the 
managements of large industrial firms and governments who seek passive patient capital and 
beneficial relationships with overseas investors. Thus financial liberalisation and 
internationalisation can allow new sources of patient capital through overseas state investors. 
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Introduction 
Within wide-ranging debates about ‘Varieties of Capitalism’ (VoC), a key issue has been 
whether financial internationalisation and liberalisation undermine the supply of ‘patient 
capital’, which in coordinated market economies (CMEs) and mixed market economies 
(MMEs) has been a central element of ‘insider’ systems of corporate governance in which firms 
enjoy cooperative and close relationships with investors (O’Sullivan 2007, Callaghan 2015, 
Fioretos 2010, Culpepper 2005, Gospel, Pendleton, and Vitols 2014, Goyer 2006, 2011, 
Fichtner 2015). The literature has focused on private overseas capital, which is treated as being 
‘impatient’ and often threatening to established ‘insiders’.  
In contrast, we argue that not all overseas outsiders can be treated as a single category. In 
particular, much of the literature has neglected foreign state investors, which have become 
increasingly important in recent years. The most prominent are sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) 
(Clark, Dixon, and Monk 2013, Bolton, Samana, and Stiglitz 2012), but others include public 
pension funds and state-owned enterprises. We examine how and why different types of 
‘insiders’ in CMEs and MMEs respond to equity investments by SWFs- do they treat such 
overseas state investment as threatening existing corporate governance systems or accept them 
as new sources of capital? We study policy responses in France and Germany, as examples of 
an MME and CME. Both have had insider systems of corporate governance based on ‘patient 
capital’ and both have faced financial liberalisation and declines in traditional sources of 
domestic patient capital.  
Contrary to expectations and in sharp contrast to their public hostility towards ‘impatient’ 
overseas private investors, an alliance between the political executive and managers in large 
industrial companies in both countries has not just welcomed but even actively sought to attract 
equity investments by SWFs. This alliance has overcome opposition or suspicion by other 
domestic insiders and policy makers. Its members have favoured SWF investments on the 
grounds of providing patient capital that is also ‘passive’- ie not demanding ‘voice’ in company 
management, as well as offering other advantages such as exports. .We find that despite historic 
differences between the two countries, similar alliances welcomed SWF equity investment, 
suggesting that findings may apply more widely to different types of coordinated economy. 
Equally, although the desire for overseas state sources of patient capital was accentuated by 
the Great Recession, it began earlier and has continued even in a country that has largescale 
trade surpluses, suggesting that this is not just a temporary response to economic crisis. 
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Our overall argument is thus that, paradoxically, firms and policy makers in CMEs and MMEs 
can use internationalisation and liberalisation to find new sources of patient capital from 
overseas state investors. Using our cases, we develop hypotheses concerning which actors form 
part of new coalitions that welcome overseas state investor and conditions under which they 
do so. In particular, we expect a coalition of industrial firms and the government to pursue 
overseas sources of capital when traditional domestic sources of patient capital decline and 
overseas investors are both patient and passive. In CMEs and MMEs, the coalition seeks to 
direct overseas state capital into specific firms, in contrast to LMEs, where policy makers and 
firms welcome foreign capital regardless of whether it is patient in order to maximise share 
prices and company valuations. 
We thus seek to contribute to wider debates about whether internationalisation and 
liberalisation of markets necessarily run counter to the provision of patient capital.  We bring 
in the state both as an investor and a domestic policy maker. We put forward arguments about 
the conditions and strategies that lead firms and policy makers in CMEs and MMEs to attract 
overseas state sources of capital which can be tested in other countries. 
The rest of this article is structured as follows. The next section discusses previous literature. 
The second section then explains our choice of case and method. Thereafter we analyse German 
and French policy responses. The last section offers a wider discussion of the findings and 
hypotheses. 
 
1. Previous literature on varieties of corporate governance, financial internationalisation 
and patient capital 
Corporate governance systems are often classified into two categories, depending on the 
‘patience’ of capital and the distance in relationships between key actors (see Jackson 2001, 
McCahery et al. 2002, Vitols 2004). Shareholder systems, of which the UK and US are the best 
examples, are characterised by ‘impatient capital’, notably that provided by shareholders. 
These are often referred to as ‘outsider’ systems because shareholders exercise control by 
threatening to exit through withdrawing their capital. In contrast, in stakeholder systems, best 
exemplified by Germany, capital is more ‘patient’, being provided over the long term by banks 
and/or company cross-shareholdings. These are often called ‘insider’ systems because 
stakeholders- banks and cross shareholding companies as well as employees- can exercise 
‘voice’ inside the system, instead of exit. In state-led or ‘mixed market’ economies, the state 
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provides or coordinates the provision of capital (Schmidt 1996). In most of the comparative 
political economy literature, financial markets such as equity markets, are seen as mainly 
offering impatient capital whereas patient capital is mainly supplied through ‘relational 
banking’ (Deeg and Hardie 2016). 
Financial internationalisation and liberalisation increase the scope for overseas provision of 
capital. But whereas ‘outsider’ systems such as those in the UK and US are seen to be relatively 
open to foreign investment because this does not undermine ‘arms-length’ relationships among 
actors, such investments may upset long-term relationships between key actors that were 
coordinating their actions in stakeholder or state-led systems in CMEs and MMEs. It runs 
counter to the provision of the long-term patient capital and conflicts with non-market 
coordination in other spheres of the economy. Moreover, insider systems have few outsiders, 
so that any outsiders are more likely to be foreign, raising issues of nationality (cf. Callaghan 
2015). 
A major debate has arisen as to the effects of increased international capital mobility and the 
emergence of new types of investors on ‘insider’ systems. One view is that they undermine 
them by moving towards an ‘outsider’ model of governance characterised by ‘impatient 
capital’ and distant relationships between firm managers and suppliers of capital (Rajan and 
Zingales 2003, Gilson 2001). But the contrary view suggests that pre-existing institutions and 
institutional complementarities either in corporate governance or in other spheres such as 
industrial relations, block or mediate exogenous pressures for an outsider model (Culpepper 
2011, Whitley 1999).  
In this article, we do not take a position in this general debate about the extent of change in 
corporate governance. Instead, we question whether financialisation and liberalisation only 
lead to the entry of overseas impatient capital or whether they can result in new, overseas 
sources of patient capital emerging. This responds to one of the central issues of the special 
issue- can financial markets provide patient capital? At present, studies have focused on private 
investors such as private equity firms or hedge funds or Anglo-American institutional investors 
(Goyer and Valdivielso 2014, Goyer and Kwan Jung 2011, O’Sullivan 2007, Callaghan 2015, 
Fioretos 2010, Culpepper 2005, Gospel, Pendleton, and Vitols 2014, Goyer 2006, 2011, 
Fichtner 2015).  
These studies share a number of limitations. First, they usually assume that all outsiders 
threaten or weaken existing institutional complementarities by being ‘impatient’ investors. Yet 
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the possibility that some overseas outsiders may offer patient capital and hence form part of 
strategies by existing insiders to maintain or adapt institutional complementarities should be 
considered. Second, the specification of the preferences and strategies of actors is rather 
categorical- corporate governance ‘insiders’ oppose the entry of outsiders while suppliers of 
‘patient capital’ (banks or the state) supply it in return for ‘voice’. Yet such preferences may 
differ in an internationalised financial system. Hence some ‘insiders’ may seek the entry of 
outsiders to adapt or support their position. Equally, patient capital suppliers may offer ‘loyalty’ 
but not seek to exercise ‘voice’ (cf Hirschman 1970) - for instance, because of lack of 
knowledge of the firm or confidence in the existing firm management. Third, while previous 
literature has paid attention to how the state reforms corporate governance regimes (Cioffi and 
Höpner 2006, Höpner 2007), less attention has been paid to how the state reacts towards 
outsiders and especially to the role of the state as an international investor.  
In this article we address these issues by exploring how different insiders and the state in insider 
systems of corporate governance react to foreign investments by a relatively new type of 
outsider, namely foreign state investors in the form of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). We 
focus on policy debates and decisions to ensure sufficient attention is given to the state as well 
as firms and labour. We examine perceptions of whether capital is patient or not, since our 
interest is in policies and strategies rather than economic outcomes. We define patient capital 
as being both long-term and unresponsive to short-term fluctuations in the profitability of the 
company in which capital is owned (cf. Deeg and Hardie 20161). It protects managers against 
hostile takeovers and allows them to pursue long-term strategies. However, we note that such 
capital can be active (loyal and seeking voice) or passive (remaining loyal but not seeking 
‘voice’ in the company’s internal decisions).2 
 
 
2. SWFs and the cases of Germany and France  
SWFs are state-owned investment entities that buy overseas assets for investment purposes 
(IWG 2008).3 The term was coined in 2005 (Rozanov 2005). The majority of large SWFs have 
been created by countries in the Middle East and in Asia (the major exception is the Norwegian 
SWF). Many have been set up over the past twenty years, especially since 2005 or have grown 
since then. Although estimates of their size vary, one is that they had around $1.5 trillion of 
assets under management on 2005 and $6-7 trillion by 2013; expectations were also high in the 
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mid-2000s of rapid expansion, with optimistic views that they would expand to perhaps $13 
trillion by 2015.4 Explanations for their rise can be found in the changing nature of the 
international economy, the rise of commodity prices, an attempt to tackle the resource curse, 
domestic politics and policy emulation (eg Drezner 2008, Cohen 2009, Truman 2010, Langland 
2009, Clark, Dixon and Monk 2013, Chwieroth 2014). 
We focus on SWFs for a number of reasons. First, SWFs are significant actors: since the 2000s, 
they have grown in size and number to reach trillions of dollars today, accounting for 
significant shares of world equity markets and taking stakes in Western private companies. 
Considered together, SWFs are larger than hedge funds (1.4 compared to 3.1 trillion for SWFs) 
and private equity funds (0.8 trillion in 2009) (Yi-Chong 2009: 4), both of which have received 
considerable attention in the literature, although they remain smaller than pension (21 trillion 
in 2009) and mutual funds (19.6 trillion). Table 1 sets out asset size and date of creation of 
some of the largest SWFs in the world.  
Second, SWFs are state owned and therefore can arouse fears that they may use their 
investments for ‘political’ aims, are insufficiently transparent and may take over firms in 
‘strategic’ industries (Cohen 2009, Slawotsky 2008/9). Such fears may be exaggerated or 
misplaced, or indeed SWFs may be welcomed if they increase share prices and company 
valuations (Bortolloti et al 2009, Fernandes and Bris 2009) or can deal with global imbalances 
or provide funding during economic crisis (Langland 2009). 
 
Table 1: Selected Sovereign Wealth Funds 
Country Sovereign Wealth Fund Name 
Assets 
$Billion Inception 
Norway Government Pension Fund – Global $882 1990 
UAE – Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Authority $773 1976 
Saudi Arabia SAMA Foreign Holdings $757.2 n/a 
China China Investment Corporation $746.7 2007 
Kuwait Kuwait Investment Authority $592 1953 
China SAFE Investment Company $547 1997 
Singapore Government of Singapore Investment Corporation $344 1981 
Qatar Qatar Investment Authority $256 2005 
Singapore Temasek Holdings $193.6 1974 
UAE – Dubai Investment Corporation of Dubai $183 2006 
UAE – Abu Dhabi Abu Dhabi Investment Council $110 2007 
Russia Reserve Fund $88.9 2008 
Source: SWF Institute- http://www.swfinstitute.org/fund-rankings/ 
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In examining policies towards SWFs, we analyse the strategies and the preferences of different 
actors in Germany and France. The two countries are frequently cited as examples of CMEs 
and MMEs respectively that had domestic patient capital and were highly closed to overseas 
private investors. At the same time, the traditional sources of patient capital have differed 
somewhat between the two, with strong reliance on bank-based capital and a complex network 
of cross-shareholding to develop long-term industrial strategies in Germany (Höpner  2007, 
Goyer 2011), and a more direct role for the state in France in steering and financing by 
controlling significant shareholdings in key industrial conglomerates and providing credit 
(Zysman 1983). But from the 1980s onwards the two countries introduced significant 
liberalisation of their financial markets, stock markets grew and foreign ownership also 
increased (van der Zwan 2014: 115, Goyer 2006, 2011, Fichtner 2015) and the nature of bank 
lending changed (Hardie, Howarth, Maxfield. and Verdun 2013). Hence we can study whether 
inherited different sources of capital in non-liberal market economies lead to diverse policies 
towards SWFs. 
Our focus is on policy debates and decisions (legislation and strategies) towards SWFs as 
perceived new sources of patient capital. In addition to legislation, official reports, and in-depth 
analysis of all articles mentioning SWFs in several major French and German newspapers, we 
collected data on SWF share investments using various established financial databases (see 
online appendix). We use both structured comparison and process tracing to explore how 
insiders respond to SWFs. The research design is inductive- generating hypotheses concerning 
the role of the state and strategies towards SWF investments as sources of capital that can be 
tested elsewhere.  
 
 
3. German policies towards SWF equity investment  
Internationalisation and the threat to patient capital and insider corporate governance  
Traditionally in Germany, domestic banks provided ‘patient capital’ to industrial firms in a 
system of ‘relational banking’, alongside allied firms and families (Vitols 2004, Höpner and 
Krempel 2004). The system was underpinned by a system of cross-shareholding: in 1999, 
cross-shareholding was around 37% in Germany compared to 1.2% in the UK (Callaghan 2015: 
405). Many firms had one major, stable shareholder- in the mid-1990s, the median size of the 
largest shareholding block was 57% in Germany compared to 9.9% in the UK and 5.4% in the 
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New York Stock Exchange (Barca and Becht 2001: 19, Table 1.1). Hence banks and large firms 
were key ‘insider’ actors, together with trade unions, notably through industry associations.  
However, the provision of capital altered in Germany, although there is a debate about how far 
this has gone and implications for corporate governance. From a low base, financialisation and 
internationalisation grew from the 1990s onwards. Encouraged by government policies, stock 
market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP rose from less than 20% in the 1980s to more 
than 60% by 2000 (Goyer 2003, Figure 1, Thatcher 2007). In the 1990s, foreign investors 
started coming into Germany, reliance on bank finance began to decline, especially for large 
firms, and existing institutional investors declared their intention to invest according to 
“shareholder value principles” (Deeg 2009, Goyer 2011; Fichtner 2015; Vitols 2004: 362), a 
development that was linked directly to internationalisation. By the 2000s, change was 
considerable- Fichtner’s (2015: table 2) analysis of 160 German large corporations in 2011 
suggests that more than half of them no longer have a German blockholder while foreign 
investors’ holdings have risen.  
 
Debates about foreign investment and SWFs 
There was much debate in Germany about the maintenance of patient capital and foreign 
investment in the 2000s. There were worries that the weakening of long-term relationships 
between German banks and firms and declines in cross-shareholdings , would lead to the entry 
of short-term ‘speculative’ investors and German companies being bought and then be broken 
up without consideration for long-term growth or the interests of employees (Donger et al, 
2008; Höpner and Krempel 2004:352). Workers and managers were often allies in expressing 
concerns about outside investors such as hedge funds and private equity firms (Gourevitch and 
Shinn 2005, Engelen, Konings and Fernandez 2008, cf. Fioretos 2010). They were joined by 
politicians- in a noted and graphic statement in 2005, Franz Müntefering, chairman of the 
Social Democratic Party, attacked foreign private equity firms as “swarms of locusts that fall 
on companies, stripping them bare before moving on”. 
SWFs had made few investments before the 2000s. The main exception - a holding in Daimler 
by the Kuwait Investment Authority dating back to the 1974 when it represented 14% of the 
company’s equity5- had been controversial and several major companies reacted by introducing 
voting rights restrictions to protect themselves against investors from Gulf oil producing 
countries (Roth 1975). In the late 2000s, as SWFs grew and the concept was developed, strong 
9 
 
concerns were expressed about their investments by traditional ‘insiders’. Within the financial 
sector, some actors expressed some support for restricting investment. For instance, Deutsche 
Bank’s CEO, Josef Ackermann, demanded protection of strategic industries against 
investments by SWFs from ‘state-permeated market economies’ (Nölke et al. 2015) such as 
China and Russia6. Some parts of the business community representing small firms opposed 
SWFs.7 Trade unions criticised financial investors who sought to maximize returns, including 
SWFs, and called for tighter regulation (Schäfer and Bläschke 2009).  
In 2007, politicians also began to discuss SWF investments. Volker Kauder (chairman of the 
CDU parliamentary group) called for national restrictions, notably due to SWFs being state 
owned.8 In a 2007 position paper, the CDU argued for more caution concerning investment 
motivated by non-profit aims such as technology transfer or “strategic political” motives. It 
suggested that the government should be allowed to intervene against an investment within 
three years without notification.9  
However, debates about SWFs revealed a surprising countervailing coalition composed of 
traditional ‘insiders’. That coalition was formed in 2007-8, before the real extent of the Great 
Recession became clear. Several key business associations spoke against new restrictions. The 
president of the German Association of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Ludwig Georg 
Braun, warned against hastily intervening in the existing liberal economic order and contended 
there was “no need for new laws”.10 Anton Börner (president of the Association of Wholesale 
and Foreign Trade) argued that the “suggestions are not well thought through and not feasible 
in Germany’s enterprise landscape”.11 Equally, both the Federation of German Industries (BDI) 
and the Working Group of Self-employed Entrepreneurs opposed the planned changes to the 
foreign trade law.12  
Many large companies saw SWFs as long-term patient and loyal investors in a context where 
their traditional networks and sources of patient capital had been weakened. SWFs were seen 
as willing to support companies over the long-term without seeking ‘voice’ in terms of seeking 
board membership or altering the existing management and its strategies. For instance, a 
representative of Bankhaus Metzler said the “investors from the Middle East follow long-term 
investment strategies”.13  Similarly, Siemens contended that SWF investments helped protect 
the interests of long-term investors and strengthened the company’s ability to protect itself 
against rivals.14 Talking about an Abu Dhabi SWF, Matthias Mitscherlich, CEO of MAN-
Ferrostaal, declared that “since our investor is not bound to quarterly reports they can view 
projects more long-term. This gives us a bit more freedom”.15  
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The combination of long-term investment horizon and loyalty was also put forward by SWF 
investors. For instance, the head of ADIA emphasised their “long-term investments”16 and the 
head of the Qatari SWF also argued that they were “well-meaning long-term investors”.17 The 
two features were also apparent in the most prominent case of SWF investment, KIA’s stake 
in Daimler. In 2014, the KIA Chairman said: “Over the past 40 years, KIA has been a 
shareholder in Daimler even during its difficult days as we never lost faith in the brilliance of 
our common company”. The value of supportive long-term SWF investment for managers was 
underlined by the Chairman of Daimler’s Management Board: “In the past 40 years the KIA 
has backed our decisions, has given us room to manoeuvre and the freedom to move forward”.18 
 
2009 Legislation and subsequent policies towards SWFs 
The debate on foreign investment led to new legislation in 2009. The legislative process and 
subsequent use (or non-use) of legal powers, as well as informal behaviour, illustrates the 
strategies and welcome of the coalition of large firms and their associations with key members 
of the federal government towards long-term overseas state investors such as SWFs, as distinct 
from short-term private overseas investors such as hedge funds.  
The position of the federal government evolved over time. Initially, in the face of calls for 
action against foreign investors, the Finance Minister, Peer Steinbrück, argued for strict new 
regulations, especially regarding strategic industries.19 The economics minister, Michael Glos 
also supported a general registration requirement for large investments to safeguard 
“Germany’s national industrial policy interests”20, albeit without singling out SWFs. But when 
German industry began to oppose stricter regulations in mid-2008, the most protectionist 
elements of the federal political executive, notably in the economics ministry, changed 
position. Instead, they began to minimise the reach of the law and emphasise that SWFs were 
“highly welcome in Germany”.21 Thus for example, Bernd Pfaffenbach (state secretary in the 
Economics Ministry) suggested that there was no need for additional state intervention in the 
market and considered that devising a list of key industries would be problematic.22 Peer 
Steinbrück’s position towards SWF investment also altered as from May 2008 he began to 
argue that Germany welcomed SWF investments and praised KIA’s presence in Germany (for 
instance in Daimler).23  
After the public debates, legislation was passed in 2009 as an amendment to the Foreign 
Investment Act (AWG).24 The 2009 AWG covered all types of non-EU investment in German-
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based firms. It allowed the federal government to audit and ban purchases of voting shares in 
excess of 25% if these investments have the potential to compromise ‘public security or public 
order’. Thus at first sight, Germany appeared to restrict SWF investments through new 
legislation. However, a closer examination reveals a rather different picture. The 2009 law was 
motivated more by fears of private foreign investors than SWFs and its scope for controlling 
SWFs is in fact rather limited since very few SWFs take 25% stakes of voting shares; moreover, 
other types of participations that do not grant voting rights, such as “preferred shares” or “profit 
participation rights” are not covered by the law (Theiselmann 2009: 1498). The Ministry is not 
obliged to undertake an investigation and must complete it within three months of the share 
purchase, after which the investment is deemed accepted by default. The Economics Ministry 
also needs the consent of other ministries and of the federal government (Schäfer and Bläschke 
2009).  
The period after the passing of the new law saw a significant increase in reports about actual 
SWF investments taking place. Yet, several studies found the law was not used and did not 
restrict foreign investments (eg Jost 2013). Similarly, the Ministry of Economics, confirmed in 
an email in April 2013 that despite 140 applications, “no investment has been prohibited or 
restricted in any way under article 53” [of the 2009 law].25  
Moreover, increased SWF investments were met with very few comments by politicians. 
Insofar as the government made public statements, these welcomed SWFs. Thus between 
February and October 2009, the Minister of Economics and Technology, Karl-Theodor zu 
Guttenberg (CSU), who  had written a commentary arguing that Germany was open to 
investments, rarely mentioned SWFs and always in a positive light, stating that while the law 
was meant to protect “core security interests”, investment limitations would in practice remain 
an absolute exception.26 Then after Angela Merkel’s re-election as Chancellor in October 2009, 
the Economics Ministry was given to Rainer Brüderle (FDP) who defined regulation of SWFs 
as a purely economic question, opposed any further legislative changes against SWFs and 
instead argued that economic competition was sufficient.27  
But the federal government went beyond abstaining from using legal powers. Several senior 
ministers travelled to SWF host countries to minimise the reach of the law and to convince 
SWFs to invest in major German companies as well as support exports. For instance, during a 
visit to Kuwait, Peer Steinbrück stated that Germany was “highly interested” in SWF 
investments.28 Another example is Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (CSU) who went to Abu Dhabi 
as part of the federal government’s strategy to aid Opel find a new investor. It is noteworthy 
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that the federal government explicitly preferred a SWF investment than a German public 
intervention.29 Ministers argued that SWFs provided reliable long-term investors, as well as 
forming part of wider mutual strategies whereby SWF host countries increased imports from 
Germany.30 
Indeed, we observe a clear increase in SWF investments in Germany and a number of well-
known German companies openly searched for state investors from the Gulf region and from 
China after 2007. As table 2 indicates, SWFs, especially from the Gulf, have made significant 
investments in major German firms across many sectors- from manufacturing and chemicals 
to finance, energy and real estate. They have taken stakes in prominent national companies 
such as Siemens, Volkswagen, Porsche, Re Insurance Munich or Springer. On almost all 
occasions, the investment was welcomed and sometimes actively sought by the firm’s 
management and/or senior policy makers- for example, Daimler endorsed purchases by Dubai 
Holdings in 2005 (reportedly 2%, sold in 2009), and Porsch and Volkwsagen welcomed.QIA. 
SWFs often bought when managements were facing falling demand and profits, and maintained 
their holdings despite difficulties thereafter, underlining their role as patient investors, and also 
sending a public signal of confidence.31 In many cases, SWFs are among the largest 
shareholders in these companies due to dispersed share ownership. Thus for instance, KIA is 
the third largest shareholder in Daimler and the second largest shareholder in GEA group, Qatar 
is the third largest shareholder in Volkswagen, and CIC is the fifth largest shareholder in 
Eutelstat.32 At the same time, SWFs did not demand ‘voice’ in terms of board seats. As Table 
2 shows, SWFs had a (supervisory) board seat on only one of the companies in which they 
invested.  
In sum, after the 2009 law, prominent German firms and senior politicians in the executive 
actively sought SWF investments. The strategy stands in sharp contrast to suspicion towards 
overseas private investors such as hedge funds, even from ‘friendly’ countries such as the US. 
The surprising active promotion of SWFs investments despite previous opposition by members 
of parliament and trade unions, and to a lesser extent some banks, is best construed as the 
product of an alliance between the executive and large companies. This coalition has sought 
SWF investments because they saw them as loyal patient capital- stable, long-term investors 
who did not seek ‘voice’ in company management nor withdraw in difficult periods. This 
started before the crisis of 2007/8 but the latter accentuated these trends. 
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Table 2: Examples of SWF equity investments in Germany 
SWF Name Target Major sector of 
target 
Size of Stake 
in % 
Date Supervisory 
Board seat 
SAFE 
(China) 
Munich Re 
Insurance  
Finance Over 3.00 Aug 2011 No 
ADIA (UAE) 
with others  
E-ON Gas 
Grid 
Energy n.a as part of 
consortium 
(100 in total) 
May 2012 No 
QIA (Qatar)  Siemens Telecoms, 
communications and 
IT 
About 3.00 May 2012 No  
GIC (Sing) MTU Aero 
Engines AG 
Defence 3.03 As of Sept 
2014 
No 
Temasek 
(Sing) 
Evonik Manufacturing and 
chemicals 
4.64 10 March 
2013 
No  
GPFG 
(Norway)  
Kabel 
Deutschland 
Holding AG 
Telecoms, 
communications and 
IT 
5.25 As to 
05.07.2011  
No 
ADIA (via 
Aabar 
Investment)  
Daimler Manufacturing and 
chemicals 
Reduction 
from 9 
(reduced to 
3)  
May 2012 No 
KIA (Kuwait) Daimler Manufacturing and 
chemicals 
(7.6); 6.8 (Jan 2009); 
1974, stake 
as of June 
2014 
No 
KIO (Kuwait) GEA Group Manufacturing and 
chemicals 
7.9 Jan 2009 Yes 
Qatar 
Holding 
(Qatar) 
 
Porsche Manufacturing and 
chemicals 
10.00 Sept 2009 No 
Sources: Thomson One Banker; Sovereign Wealth Funds News, Report Libyan Investment Authority (2010), 
SDC Platinum; Monitor Group; Reuters, Bloomberg, Wall Street Journal.  
 
 
4. Policies towards SWF equity investment in France  
Internationalisation and the threat to insider corporate governance  
In France, the state traditionally provided ‘patient capital’ through public ownership of major 
industries and banks, and by channelling credit to selected large companies and sectors, as part 
of wider industrial strategies (Hancké 2001, Zysman 1983). In addition, family ownership 
remained strong. Foreign investments required government approval and French companies 
were largely closed to foreign equity. In addition, companies were often protected by cross-
shareholdings- for instance, in 1999 cross-shareholding was around 20% in France compared 
to 1.2% in the UK (Callaghan 2015: 405). In the mid-1990s, the median size of the largest 
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shareholding block was 20% in France, much higher than in the UK (0.9%) and the New York 
Stock Exchange (5.4%) (Barca and Becht 2001: 19, Table 1.1).  
However, from the mid-1980s onwards, this context began to change as state ownership and 
state provided credit fell. With so-called ‘national champions’ facing increasing domestic and 
international pressures, privatisation became an attractive option to governments of Left and 
Right (Deeg and Perez 2000, Schmidt 1996). As a result, French companies’ ownership 
structure evolved (Morin 2000). Cross-shareholding fell by one third (from 30% to 20%) in the 
1990s alone (ibid: 38) and stock market capitalisation as a percentage of GDP rose from less 
than 20% in the 1980s to more than 100% in France by 2000 (Goyer 2003, Figure 1, Thatcher 
2007). Foreign ownership of the stock exchange increased from 10% to 35% between 1985 
and 1997 (Morin 2000: 41) and in the 2000s overseas investors, especially ‘impatient’ Anglo-
American investors such as hedge funds, further invested in large French firms (Goyer 2011, 
Deeg 2009).  
 
Debates about foreign equity investment and legislative reform  
In the late 1990s and 2000s debates emerged in France concerning additional regulatory 
restrictions on foreign equity investments.33 They reached a peak after rumours of a hostile 
takeover of Danone by American firm PepsiCo in the summer of 2005.34 Both companies were 
privately owned but the bid was condemned by unions and political parties of Left and Right, 
and PepsiCo did not proceed. At that time, little reference had been made to SWFs in the French 
debate. Explicit mentions in the French media first appeared in Le Figaro in June 2007 with an 
article entitled “Sovereign Funds, the new ‘enfants terribles’ of finance”. Media attention grew, 
with over 1,000 articles mentioning SWFs in Le Figaro and the financial newspaper Les Echos 
alone, underlining their expansion and likely importance.  
Most of the initial opposition to SWFs came from the French parliament and parts of the 
financial sector. In October 2007, a Senate report expressed concerns about SWFs’ lack of 
transparency and potential geopolitical aims and denounced the “seductive discourse” 
according to which these funds should be welcomed.35 Some members of parliament declared 
that “we need…to prevent SWFs from Qatar or Asia from buying our companies at demeaning 
prices”.36 As in Germany, some parts of the financial sector felt threatened by SWFs. For 
instance, Eric Pelletier, a private equity associate director, argued that the firepower of SWFs 
would allow them to “take positions in undervalued companies in stock markets” and “to attack 
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when the time is right” resulting in “large-scale hostile operations”.37 Similarly, the chief 
economist of Crédit Agricole contended that French small and medium companies could be 
‘swallowed’ by SWFs.38 The comments suggest that the crisis increased opposition by financial 
actors concerned about foreign investors buying under-valued companies. 
In contrast, large firms and the political executive were favourable to SWF equity investment. 
This began before the economic crisis of 2007/8 but then grew as traditional state funding was 
seen as increasingly constrained and firms sought new sources of long-term capital. Indeed, 
policy makers highlighted the SWFs’ capacity to provide patient capital (Demarrole 2009: 21; 
Banque de France, 2008). Their position formed part of wider arguments that there were 
insufficient national savings, particularly in stocks and that French companies therefore needed 
foreign investment (Bo 2011: 14). For their part, SWFs underlined that they would be patient, 
loyal investors. Thus for example, Dubai International Capital (DIC), which acquired 3.12% 
of the capital of EADS (European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company), stated that it 
would “seek to build a strategic relation with the company’s board” but did not intend to take 
an activist stance.39 
Major companies openly sought SWF investments as sources of patient and loyal capital, often 
to shore up the positions of existing managers. Thus for instance, oil group Total Fina Elf 
confirmed that Chinese funds held 1.6% of their shares40, as well as from four other SWFs 
including Abu Dhabi and Kuwait. The company and its then head, Christophe de Margerie, 
argued that the presence of SWFs was a “financially valuable asset over the long run”.41 
Another example is Arnaud Lagardère who headed a major media group. He argued that he 
was “favourable to SWFs because they are long-term investors” and was “satisfied with the 
presence of Qatar in the capital of Lagardère group”. An analyst commenting QIA’s 
investments pointed out that this was good news because they invest over the long-term and 
could help Lagardère. At the same time the deal was criticised by an American investor, Guy 
Wyser-Pratte, who had failed to get a seat in Lagardère’s supervisory board in 2010, and argued 
that the Qatari shareholders were “friends of Jean-Luc Lagardère and are trying to lock the 
capital in favour of the son”.42 The investment illustrates how SWFs  can provide helpful 
protection for existing management, both through holdings and as part of wider supportive 
coalitions. 
The case of the nuclear power firm Areva illustrates the importance of both patient and loyal 
SWF investments. Areva’s management brought in KIA as an investor in 2010 and then started 
discussions with additional funds, including from China,43 as profit margins eroded due to 
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problems in its next generation of nuclear power stations and also when its then head, Anne 
Lauvergeon, was engaged in a fierce battle to keep the company’s independence from EDF. 
The company welcomed KIA and declared that its stake would “enable the group to strengthen 
its equity and pursue its development plan with a reinforced capital structure”.44 The deal was 
particularly attractive to the board because “KIA will not have a seat on the Areva supervisory 
board”.45 In contrast, Areva and Anne Lauvergeon strongly and successfully resisted a possible 
investment by the QIA, which was linked to her political enemies, notably President Sarkozy 
and the then head of EDF Henri Proglio.46 
The political executive was also very favourable to SWF investments and made an explicit 
distinction between different types of outsiders. For instance, French president Nicolas Sarkozy 
distinguished between those who invest “long-term“ for a “financial return“ and those who 
attempt to “destabilise companies and … steal their technologies”.47 In March 2008, French 
economics and finance minister Christine Lagarde commissioned a report “to analyse the new 
role of SWFs but also propose guidelines to define France's strategy towards SWFs”.48 The 
report called on France to develop investment projects that were likely to attract SWFs.49 
Crucially, it argued that no special rules for SWF investments were required and that the main 
question was how to attract SWF investments to France.50  
 
Legislation and policies towards SWFs 
Opposition to foreign investments in general led to several revisions to maintain national 
regulatory restrictions within the constraints of EU law. In the initial formulation of the Code 
Financier and monétaire, foreign investments could be blocked by the economics ministry 
where they might threaten public order, public authority and security or national defence or 
involved the weapons industry.51 However, the European Court of Justice ruled that this was 
too broad,52 and in March 200353 the domains in which foreign investments require prior 
authorisation by the economics ministry were specified. Following the PepsiCo-Danone 
controversy, a decree in 200554 extended the authorisation remit to cover ‘strategic’ sectors (eg 
defence, technology, security) if the investment represented a threat (eg to preserving R&D 
activities and security of supply chains or if the recipient company is involved in weapons, 
security, defence).55 Several rounds of amendments followed, again as a result of criticisms by 
the European Commission.56 
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Although the legislation contained considerable powers to restrict foreign equity investment, 
the extensions were driven by private foreign investment, not SWFs. In practice, the 
government has not blocked any investments by SWFs, including those from the Middle East 
and China which have bought stakes in important companies in major sectors such as 
communications, energy and even defence/aerospace. Table 3 sets out some prominent 
examples of SWF investments. 
Several SWF investments have been in major economically and politically sensitive French 
firms and sectors.  The Dubai International Capital (DIC) acquired 3.12% of the capital of 
EADS (European Aeronautic Defence and Space Company)- a large defence and aerospace 
company, with a major role in Airbus- in July 2007.57 The Qatar Investment Authority has 
bought stakes in utilities (Veolia), chipmakers (Altis), construction (Vinci), entertainment (La 
Fermière de Cannes) but also in strategic sectors such as shipping (CMA CGM), technology 
(Lagardere) and Aeronautics (EADS). China’s SAFE investment company bought up to 1.6% 
of France’s major oil group, Total, in 2008. In 2011, China’s other SWF, CIC, invested in GDF 
Suez and in Dexia Asset Management. In many cases, SWFs were among the largest 
shareholders in these companies. Thus, for instance, KIA is the 3rd largest shareholder in Areva, 
Qatar is the 2nd largest shareholder in Lagardère group, the 3rd largest shareholder in Vinci and 
the 7th largest shareholder in Veolia, and CIC is the 13th largest shareholder in Total. Yet SWFs 
have rarely sought ‘voice’ through a seat on the management board- in only two of the 
examples of investments set out in Table 3. 
The political executive has not just allowed SWF share purchases but gone much further by 
actively seeking them. Senior politicians such as Presidents Nicolas Sarkozy and François 
Hollande, and economics minister Christine Lagarde or external trade minister Nicole Bricq, 
pursued investments from Qatar, Saudi Arabia and China.58 In their visits, they also promoted 
trade deals with major French companies. 59The QIA became an increasingly privileged 
partner, representing as much as a third of the aggregate valuations of all SWF shareholdings 
in French companies (Po 2011: 21) and building close personal links with politicians such as 
Nicolas Sarkozy. To attract and direct investments, the executive decided that the Caisse des 
Dépôts (CDC), a public financial body and traditional provider of state ‘patient capital’ to 
major French firms, should become the ‘entry gate’ for SWFs into France.60 The CDC created 
a long-term investor club to which SWFs were invited to participate in a forum in 2009.61 It 
also started undertaking joint investments with SWFs- for instance, with the QIA to invest in 
French SMEs.62 By 2014, the CDC had created a more formal structure, CDC International 
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Capital, which was jointly funded by the CDC and various SWFs63, and later signed agreements 
with Emirati, Russian, and Qatari SWFs.64 Finally, France created its own SWF, the Fonds 
Stratégique d'Investissements (FSI) in October 2008,65 which then developed partnerships with 
foreign SWFs to attract their investments- for instance, Gulf SWFs in energy projects.66  
In sum, large companies and the political executive have increasingly used SWF investments 
to attract patient, loyal capital for major French firms, as well as accessing foreign markets and 
developing joint investment ventures. The pro-SWF stance contrasts markedly with these 
insiders’ concerns about foreign private investors.  
 
Table 3: Examples of SWF investments in France 
SWF Name Target Major sector of 
target 
Size of 
Stake in 
% 
Date SWF 
representativ
e on 
management 
board 
CIC (China) Eutelsat 
Communications 
Telecoms, 
communications 
and IT 
7.06 As of Sept 
2014 
No 
SAFE 
(China) 
Total Energy 1.60 As of 2012 No  
QIA 
(Qatar) 
Veolia Others or 
diversified 
5.00 n.a Yes 
QIA (Qatar) LVMH Retail, 
hospitality, 
services and 
tourism 
1.00 As of 
02.07.2012 
No 
Qatar 
Holding 
(Qatar) 
Vivendi  Telecoms, 
communications 
and IT 
1.56 As of Sept 
2014 
No 
QIA (Qatar) Vinci Real estate 5.8 n.a Yes 
QIA (Qatar)  Total Energy 3.00 2012 No 
KIA 
(Kuwait) 
Areva Energy 4.8 2010 No 
CIC 
(China) 
GDF Suez Energy 10.00 Unveiled on 
10.08.2011 
No 
QIA (Qatar) Lagardère Telecoms, 
communications 
and IT 
12.83 As of Sept 
2014 
No 
Sources: as table 2. 
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Conclusions and discussion 
In both Germany and France, traditional forms of patient capital, notably block holdings and 
domestic state ownership, have declined from the 1990s onwards. Concomitantly, financial 
markets, including stock markets, have grown, internationalised and been liberalised. The 
traditional corporate governance model of long-term relationships between insiders based on 
patient capital would seem to be threatened. 
Yet policy makers and the managers of prominent firms in both countries have welcomed non-
Western SWF purchases of equity in major national companies. Indeed, they have gone further 
on many occasions by actively seeking such investment. Such policies are surprising, given 
that SWFs are not just ‘outsiders’ but foreign outsiders from non-democratic countries. SWFs 
can raise issues of security and political uses of investments, yet have taken stakes in major 
national companies, including in very sensitive sectors.  
Our analysis shows that the welcome for SWF investments came from a new coalition of 
‘insiders’ that involved key parts of the political executive  and the senior managers of large, 
established firms from the non-financial sector. This coalition overcame opposition by other 
traditional insiders, notably parts of the financial sector, parliamentary representatives and 
trade unions, thanks to its combined strength and ability to define the issue  of SWFs in 
economic terms and use SWF patient capital to buttress existing forms of coordination. Its 
members saw advantages from SWF equity investments. The most important was that SWFs 
offered passive patient capital- offering loyalty but not demanding ‘voice’, together with the 
possibility of increased orders from their home countries, thereby bolstering the position of 
existing managements. SWF investments also formed part of overseas trade and political 
strategies by the political executive. 
SWF patient capital allows certain insiders in each country to bolster their pre-existing 
positions. Although governments in both Germany and France pursued policies to welcome 
SWFs, their role and the relationships they have built with SWF differed, reflecting the nature 
of coordination in each country. In Germany, large private companies led debates. After an 
initial period of wavering, the Federal government followed their preferences and has sought 
to aid them in attracting SWF investment. In France, the political executive has played more 
of a leadership role. It has sought direct partnerships using state funding bodies as well as 
supporting SWF investment in large French firms. Hence policies towards SWF investment 
have been more state led in France than in Germany.  
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The welcome extended to SWFs was due to a combination of factors. Policy makers and large 
firms were concerned about declining domestic sources of patient capital, especially as 
financial liberalisation and internationalisation seemed to open the door to unwelcome foreign 
investment. They were particularly hostile to impatient capital, notably from the US. The 
expansion of SWFs, notably after 2005, offered a means of responding to these concerns that 
actually used internationalisation and liberalisation. It offered a means of adapting and indeed 
sometimes reconstituting insider models of corporate governance with overseas state capital 
that was seen as both patient and not demanding voice, an ideal combination. 
Seeking SWF equity investment in France and Germany was not just part of a general move 
towards economic openness nor simply a response to the economic crisis after 2008, although 
the crisis accentuated the demand for new sources of patient capital For a start, it stands in 
sharp contrast to the hostility expressed towards private overseas investors on the grounds that 
they represented ‘impatient’ capital. Then, it also involved directing SWF investment to 
specific firms, especially large industrial firms in prominent sectors in the two countries (eg 
cars in Germany and nuclear power in France). Moreover, it was an active policy of attracting 
SWF equity investment pursued by both members of the political executive and firm managers, 
often acting in direct cooperation. Policies of welcoming SWFs began before 2008 and 
included Germany, a country with a massive trade surplus and hence no financial need for 
foreign capital.  
These findings have implications for wider debates about patient capital and ‘insider’ corporate 
governance systems. Studies in the varieties of capitalism literature have focused on the extent 
to which financial internationalisation and liberalisation have undermined the supply of ‘patient 
capital’. Thus far, both policy debates and academic studies of overseas capital have focused 
on private investors, notably hedge funds and private equity firms. They have often underlined 
the hostility towards foreign ‘outsiders’ who are seen as disrupting long-term relations among 
‘insiders’. 
Our argument is that financial internationalisation and liberalisation can not only coexist with 
patient capital but indeed result in new foreign sources of such capital. We underline the 
growing role of overseas states as international investors and providers of patient capital. SWFs 
themselves have expanded, now being larger than the hedge funds and private equity firms that 
have attracted so much academic and public attention, but other forms of international state 
investors also exist. 
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We argue that some existing insiders can adopt active strategies to adapt to financial changes 
and the decline of traditional sources of patient capital by actively seeking out overseas state 
patient capital. We posit the creation of new coalitions, notably between the managers of large 
strategic firms and the political executives which welcome and direct overseas state investors 
into specific sectors and firms. Far from being hostile to all overseas investors, certain 
traditional insiders find foreign investors to reconstitute their protective networks. The patience 
and loyalty of capital seem more important than its nationality. 
Whereas the state has often been underplayed in studies of varieties of capitalism, we underline 
its roles. One is paradoxical- overseas states helping to offset reduced domestic supplies of 
patient capital. But another involves the state within CMEs and MMEs. It sets regulatory 
frameworks and decides how to use available instruments for approving overseas investment. 
However, it also plays important informal roles in encouraging or discouraging overseas 
investment through means such as public debate and supporting or directing investments- in 
our cases, attacking investments by US hedge funds or private companies while defending and 
encouraging SWF equity purchases.  
Thus our central finding is that faced with declining sources of traditional patient capital and 
financial internationalisation and liberalisation, new coalitions of managers of large industrial 
firms and the political executive in CMEs and LMEs actively seek passive patient overseas 
state investors to support and adapt traditional insider models of corporate governance based 
on long-term relationships. How can this claim be tested more widely? One test would be to 
examine examples of responses to SWFs who sought ‘voice’ or were perceived as ‘impatient’ 
investors. The difficulty is that we have found almost no evidence of such SWF behaviour in 
Germany or France, so the examples would need to be taken from elsewhere.67 But our analysis 
reveals that impatient private foreign investors were indeed much less welcomed. Another test 
would be to study strategies and policies towards SWFs or other state investors in other CMEs 
and MMEs, either in Europe or elsewhere- for instance, in Japan. These could vary in some of 
the key explanatory factors for the welcome to SWFs identified in the two cases. Thus for 
instance, if a CME or MME had no decline in levels of domestically-provided patient capital, 
then much lower levels of welcome or indeed outright hostility to SWFs might be expected.  
A third form of testing would be to distinguish CMEs and MMEs from LMEs. We would 
expect companies and policy makers to differ in terms of strategies and coalitions. In LMEs, 
they may well either view state investors with suspicion or else accept them as part of opening 
financial markets to all regardless of nationality rather than because of their ability to offer 
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patient capital. Relationships with firm managers would also differ- with managers in LMEs 
seeking SWFs as part of shareholder value strategies of pushing up share prices and indeed 
SWFs being sought even if they were ‘impatient’ investors. Equally, government-firm 
coalitions to direct overseas investments into particular firms, especially from the industrial 
sector, would not be expected in LMEs, but instead a general openness and attraction into all 
sectors, including the financial sector. Hence the specificities of CME and MME policies 
arising from the search for patient capital can be tested by looking at other types of market 
economy. 
Policies towards SWF equity investments in Germany and France thus offer wider implications 
and hypotheses for broader debates about how internationalised and liberalised financial 
markets can provide patient capital. More generally, they point to the continuing role of the 
state- both as a supplier and as a policy maker- in ensuring the continued provision of patient 
capital. 
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Endnotes 
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